Articles Posted in Recent Cases

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In January, the El Paso Court of Appeals decided the appeal of Lazy R. Ranch, LP, et al. vs. ExxonMobil Corporation. The court reversed a summary judgment in favor of Exxon and remanded the case to the trial court for a trial on the merits. Exxon has asked the Texas Supreme Court to review the El Paso Court’s decision. Exxon argues that it has conclusively proven that Lazy R’s claims are barred by limitations.

The Lazy R Ranch is 20,000 acres in Ector, Crane, Ward and Winkler Counties. Exxon had operations on the ranch for many years. In 2009, the Ranch hired an environmental firm to investigate several sites on the property for oil-related contamination. The environmental firm found substantial hydrocarbon contamination at five sites, and found that at one of the sites the contamination had percolated down into the groundwater and that contamination at the other sites also posed a risk of leaching down into the groundwater. Lazy R sued Exxon for an injunction to require Exxon to take sufficient steps to prevent further spread of the contamination into the subsurface and groundwater.

The trial court ruled that the Ranch had waited too long to sue and dismissed its claims. The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations does not apply because the Ranch is only suing for an injunction to require Exxon to abate a continuing nuisance, the spread of hydrocarbon contamination into the subsurface.

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Chesapeake is spending a lot of money on lawyers.

Dan McDonald, a Fort Worth attorney, has filed some 250 cases against Chesapeake contending that it is underpaying its royalty owners. Companies affiliated with former House of Representatives Speaker Tom Craddick have now been added to McDonald’s client list. So many cases have been filed against it in Texas that Chesapeake asked the cases to be granted multidistrict litigation status, so that one judge could control pretrial discovery and motions and settings. Two judges have been appointed for that purpose, one for McDonald’s cases and another for cases brought by other attorneys. Chesapeake is settling cases as fast as it can.

Most of the claims against Chesapeake arise from its structure for selling gas. Chesapeake sells its gas at the wellhead to its wholly owned subsidiary Chesapeake Energy Marketing. Chesapeake Energy Marketing arranges for the gathering of the gas and delivery to central sales points, and pays Chesapeake for the gas based on a weighted average price of all sales at those central gathering points, less costs of compression, gathering, treating and transportation, and less a “marketing fee” charged by Chesapeake Energy Marketing. The costs incurred between the wellhead and the point of delivery to the purchaser were formerly incurred by another Chesapeake affiliate, Access Midstream. Chesapeake spun off its gathering systems into a separate company a few years ago, and as part of that deal it guaranteed a minimum rate of return on those gathering systems to the new spin-off company, thereby receiving a premium price in the market for the new company’s shares. Chesapeake pays royalties based on the new price it receives from Chesapeake Energy Marketing, after deduction of post-production costs and marketing fees. McDonald says that these “costs” are “sham sales” and “fraudulent transactions.”

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Residents of DISH, Texas were awarded a victory by the Amarillo Court of Appeals in their long-running fight with pipeline companies. Sciscoe et al. v. Enbridge Gathering (North Texas), L.P., et al., No. 07-13-00391-CV. In an opinion issued on June 1, the court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to a trial on their claims that the pipelines’ gathering and compression facilities caused damages to their properties from noise and emissions that constituted trespass and nuisance.

DISH residents have fought the pipeline companies for years. The companies constructed several compressors and a metering station just outside the town between 2005 and 2009. Residents began to complain of excessive noise and offensive odors and said they suffered adverse health effects. In 2008, the residents complained to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, which conducted monitoring in 2009 and 2010 and concluded that emissions from the compressors “would not be expected to cause short-term adverse health effects, adverse vegetative effects, or odors.” The Texas Department of State Health Services performed medical tests on 28 DISH residents for exposure to chemicals, and tested tap water; it found no evidence of exposure to chemicals. Those findings were contradicted by tests conducted by Plaintiffs’ expert, Wolf Eagle Environmental, which found that Plaintiffs were exposed to harmful emissions of benzene, xylene, ethyl benzene, toluene and other harmful chemicals.

Finally, 18  DISH residents sued the pipelines in 2001 for damages, alleging nuisance and trespass. The town of DISH also filed suit, seeking damages for the loss of tax revenue resulting from reduced property values caused by the compressor station.

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The Texas Supreme Court has ruled 5 to 4 that Chesapeake cannot deduct post-production costs from the Hyder family’s gas royalties.

The case in the Supreme Court actually addresses only the Hyders’ overriding royalty. As part of the Hyders’ oil and gas lease, the Hyders agreed that Chesapeake could use their land to drill horizontal wells producing from their neighbors’ land — the surface location on the Hyders’ land, but all of the productive lateral of the well under the neighbor’s property. In exchange, Chesapeake agreed to pay the Hyders a 5% royalty on production from such wells. Because the Hyders have no mineral interest in the lands from which these wells produce, the parties referred to this royalty as an overriding royalty.

The Hyders’ lease contains very specific provisions prohibiting Chesapeake from deducting post-production costs from the Hyders’ royalty on production from their lands. But the lease provision granting the overriding royalty on production from wells bottomed under their neighbors’ property is not so clear. Although Chesapeake originally fought to deduct post-production costs from both the royalties and the overriding royalties, the trial court and court of appeals ruled for the Hyders on all claims, and Chesapeake elected to appeal to the Texas Supreme Court only on the issue of deductibility of post-production costs from the Hyders’ overriding royalty.

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Last November, the Texas General Land Office lost its appeal in Commissioner v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., in the El Paso Court of Appeals. For the first time, a court has ruled that a lessee can deduct post-production costs under the Texas General Land Office’s Relinquishment Act lease form, citing Heritage Resources v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996).

The case actually involves several oil and gas leases owned by SandRidge in Pecos County, some covering lands owned by private parties, some covering Relinquishment Act lands. (The State owns the minerals under Relinquishment Act land; the surface owner is agent for the state in granting oil and gas leases, for which the surface owner receives ½ of bonuses and royalties. The lease must be approved by the GLO and be on the approved GLO lease form.) The most interesting part of the case is the court’s interpretation of the GLO’s Relinquishment Act lease form. There are somewhere between 6.4 million and 7.4 million acres of Relinquishment Act lands in Texas, principally in West Texas, in and around the Permian Basin.

SandRidge’s wells on the leases in dispute produce mostly carbon dioxide, mixed with some natural gas. Originally, SandRidge paid the GLO royalties on its sales of natural gas and carbon dioxide. More recently, SandRidge made an agreement with Oxy USA; SandRidge built a plant, the Century Plant, to extract the CO2 from SandRidge’s gas. Oxy owns and operates the plant and gets the CO2 extracted; SandRidge gets the natural gas. Oxy doesn’t charge SandRidge for separating the gas from the CO2. Oxy uses the CO2 in secondary recovery projects. The plant reportedly cost a billion dollars.

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Betty Lou Bradshaw’s parents owned 1773 acres in Hood County. In 1960, they sold the land and reserved 1/2 of the royalty on oil, gas and other minerals. Betty Lou inherited her parents’ royalty interest.

In 2005, Steadfast Financial (subsequently renamed KCM Financial) acquired the right to purchase the land. In 2006, KCM made a deal with Range Resources by which it simultaneously (1) exercised its right to purchase the land, (2) sold the land to Range, reserving all minerals, and (3) leased the mineral estate to Range. The lease provided for 1/8th royalty, and the bonus was $7,505 per acre.

Betty Lou sued KCM and Range. She alleged that they conspired to limit her royalty on production from the lease to 1/16 (1/2 of 1/8), whereas it should have been 1/8 (1/2 of 1/4), since the going rate for lease royalties in Hood County at the time was 1/4. She alleged that Steadfast had agreed to a lower royalty in order to receive an above-market bonus.

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A team of lawyers in Pennsylvania has filed an anti-trust suit against Chesapeake and Williams Partners (Formerly Access Midstream Partners) alleging that they conspired to restrain trade in the market for gas gathering services in and around Bradford County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs also sued Anadarko, Statoil, and Mitsui, all of whom own interests in Chesapeake’s leases. The suit alleges violation of the oil and gas leases granted by the plaintiffs, violations of ant-trust law, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). A copy of the complaint, filed in federal court in Pennsylvania, can be found here.

The team of lawyers who filed this suit have their own website, “Marcellus Royalty Action.” They say that their approach differs from other suits against Chesapeake in that they will not seek class action status, they intend to pursue discovery before negotiating settlements, and they will sue all working interest owners responsible for royalty payments.

Royalty owner suits against Chesapeake have become a growth industry for attorneys. Recently, Chesapeake requested that multiple royalty owner suits against it in the Barnett Shale region of Texas be assigned to a pretrial court for consolidated and coordinated pretrial proceedings.  (Defendants Joint Motion for Transfer and Request for Stay) The request says that more than 3,200 landowners have filed 97 separate suits in Johnson, Tarrant and Dallas Counties alleging that Chesapeake and Total E&P, USA, Inc. (Chesapeake’s working interest partner in the Barnett Shale) have charged excessive post-production costs. This request results primarily from multiple suits filed by the McDonald Law Firm. See http://royaltyripoff.com/.  McDonald has said he does not oppose Chesapeake’s request.

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On February 6, 2015, The Supreme Court of Texas released its second opinion in FPL Farming Ltd. (“FPL”) v. Environmental Processing Systems, L.C. (“EPS”).  The Beaumont court of appeals had held that injected fluids that migrate beyond the boundary of the land owned by the surface owner constitute a trespass on a neighbor’s property.  The Supreme Court declined to address whether or not subsurface wastewater migration is actionable as a common law trespass in Texas, and instead focused on consent as a general element of a trespass cause of action.

Until recently, subsurface wastewater migration had never been addressed by a Texas appellate court, and the assumption in the disposal industry was that such incursion was not actionable. But the Beaumont Court of Appeals, in FPL v. EPS, concluded that the neighbor does have a trespass claim.  The Beaumont Court issued two opinions in the case; the first was appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals, and the second resulted in the opinion released February 6.

The facts in FPL are these: EPS operates an injection well for non-hazardous waste on land adjacent to the land owned by FPL. FPL had previously objected to an amendment of EPS’s permit that increased the rate and volumes allowed to be injected. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed the permit amendment over FPL’s objections, ruling that “the amended permits do not impair FPL’s existing or intended use of the deep subsurface.” FPL Farming Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 2003 WL 247183 (Austin 2003, pet. denied). FPL then sued EPS for trespass and negligence, alleging that injected substances had migrated under FPL’s tract causing damage. FPL lost a jury trial and appealed. The Beaumont Court affirmed, holding that because EPS held a valid permit for its well, “no trespass occurs when fluids that were injected at deep levels are then alleged to have later migrated at those deep levels into the deep subsurface of nearby tracts.” FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems, L.C., 305 S.W.3d 739, 744-745 (Tex.App.-Beaumont). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Texas laws governing injection well permits “do not shield permit holders from civil tort liability that may result from actions governed by the permit.” FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems, L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306, 314 (Tex. 2011). But the court was careful to say it was not deciding that owners of injection wells could be guilty of trespass if their injected fluids migrated onto other lands. “We do not decide today whether subsurface wastewater migration can constitute a trespass, or whether it did so in this case.” The court remanded to the court of appeals for it to consider the other issues raised by the appeal. Continue reading →

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On January 30, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Limited Partnership, No. 12-0920. In doing so, it kept alive a $21 million verdict against Samson and limited its prior holdings barring suits by mineral owners based on the statute of limitations.

The principal claim the Hooks made against Samson alleged breach of a lease provision intended to protect the Hooks’ lease against drainage from wells on adjacent lands. The lease provided that, if a gas well is drilled within 1,320 feet of the lease, Samson must either drill an offset well, release sufficient acreage for an offset well to be drilled, or pay “compensatory royalty” – the amount of royalty the Hooks would be entitled to if the well on adjacent lands had been drilled on their lease.

In 2000, Samson permitted a well on lands adjacent to the Hooks lease, and it approached the Hooks asking permission to pool portions of the Hooks land with that well. Mr. Hooks asked Samson how close the well would be to the Hooks lease boundary. Samson sent him a plat showing that the location of the well would be 1,400 feet from the lease. Based on this, the Hooks agreed to the pooling.

In 2007, in connection with related litigation, the Hooks discovered that the adjacent well in fact was located within 1,320 feet of the Hooks lease, and the Hooks sued Samson for misrepresenting the well’s location and inducing them to agree to the pooling. They sought damages under the lease compensatory royalty clause – the royalty they would have received had the offending well been located on the Hooks’ lease. They argued that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to their claim should not apply because Samson had fraudulently induced them to believe that the well was 1,400 feet from their lease. The jury found that the Hooks should not have discovered the true facts until less than four years before bringing suit. It awarded more than $20 million damages to the Hooks. Continue reading →

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