Recent Cases

Published on: July 10, 2024

Ammonite Oil & Gas v. Railroad Commission – Supreme Court opinion on MIPA

Last week the Texas Supreme Court handed down its decision in Ammonite v. Railroad Commission, upholding the Commission’s denial of Ammonite’s MIPA application. Justice Young filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Busby. The case has little implication for most mineral owners in Texas but is an important loss for the State of Texas and an important decision for future MIPA applications.

The State of Texas owns the lands within the beds of navigable rivers and waterways, some 80,000 miles of rivers and streams. Where oil and gas development occurs adjacent to rivers, operators often lease those riverbeds and include them in pooled units. Revenues from leasing of State lands goes to the State’s permanent school fund, which funds primary education. But EOG Resources, developing horizontal wells in the Eagle Ford Shale along both sides of the Frio River, decided not to lease the State’s riverbed, and left it out of the units.

Ammonite Oil & Gas, owned by William Osborn (my first cousin) leases riverbeds and stranded State tracts from the General Land Office and works to get them included in adjacent pooled units. If it is unable to reach agreement Ammonite files an action under the MIPA.

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Published on: June 19, 2024

The Osage Nation vs. the Wind Farm

By John McFarland

Last December a federal court in Oklahoma issued an order in a long-continuing suit between the United States and the Osage Nation, as plaintiffs, and Enel Green Power North America. United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, et al., No. 4:14-cv-00704-JCG-JFJ (US Dist. Ct. N.D. Okla., Dec. 20, 2023) Enel’s subsidiary operates a wind farm on 8,400 acres of land in Osage County, with 84 wind turbines. The Osage Nation and the US government are seeking to enjoin Enel from operating its wind farm. The court’s order holds that the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction requiring Enel to remove its wind turbines.

The Osage have a fascinating history, most recently made famous by the book Killers of the Flower Moon by David Gran, and the 2023 release of the movie by the same name starring Leonardo DiCaprio.

In the early 19^th century the Osage controlled a huge area between the Missouri and Red Rivers, the Ozarks to the east, and the foothills of the Wichita Mountains to the south. The US government first required the tribe to move to a reservation in southeastern Kansas, containing some 325,000 acres of land. In 1870 Congress passed and the tribe ratified the Drum Creek Treaty, providing that the Osage Nation’s land in Kansas be sold and the proceeds paid to the Osage Nation. The Osage received $1.25 an acre for the land, which they used to purchase their present-day reservation in Oklahoma, now the county of Osage, some 1,470,000 acres. The surface estate of those lands was later “allotted” to individual tribe members, some 640 acres each, and most of those lands were later sold. But the mineral estate in the tribal lands remained with the Osage Nation, managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

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Published on: June 6, 2024

Hamilton v. ConocoPhillips – The first appellate opinion on Production Sharing Agreements

By John McFarland

In Hamilton v. ConocoPhillips, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals construed a Production Sharing Agreement – to my knowledge the first appellate court to do so.

A Production Sharing Agreement is an agreement between mineral owners and an operator to allow the operator to drill a horizontal well whose lateral will be located partly on the leased premises and partly on other lands. Generally, such agreements provide that the allocation will be based on the number of productive lateral feet of the well on each tract crossed by the well. If a well crosses Tract A and Tract B, and 60% of the productive lateral is on Tract A, then the parties agree that the royalty owners in Tract A will be paid royalty on 60% of the production from the well. Such an agreement is a form of combining multiple tracts to produce from a single well–essentially a form of pooling with a different method of allocation.

In Hamilton, Lloyd Hamilton owned a mineral interest in the original Hamilton Ranch in DeWitt County, covering some 5,000 acres, which the Hamilton family leased to Burlington Resources Oil & Gas (now a subsidiary of ConocoPhillips). After the lease was signed the family partitioned the land and Lloyd received a separate surface tract, subject to the lease. The family then signed a Production Sharing Agreement allowing Burlington to drill wells located partly on the Ranch.

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Published on: May 28, 2024

Update on Opiela v. RRC

By John McFarland

Our firm represents the Opielas, who are involved in a dispute with the Railroad Commission and Magnolia Oil & Gas over a horizontal well located partly on the Opielas’ property. The case has made its way from the Commission to the trial court in Travis County, then to the Austin Court of Appeals, and the case is now pending on petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court.

Briefly, the facts are these:

Enervest applied for a permit for an allocation well to be located partly on the Opielas’ ranch of 640 acres in Karnes County. When the Opielas purchased the ranch it was under an old oil and gas lease held by some producing vertical wells. The Opielas acquired all of the mineral estate but previous owners had sold 3/4ths of the royalty. The lease contains a pooling clause, but a special provision says there can be no pooling for oil wells.

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Published on: May 23, 2024

First challenge to new “business courts” legislation filed in Supreme Court

By John McFarland

In re Dallas County, Texas and Marian Brown, in her official capacity as Dallas County Sheriff, No. 24-0426, Texas Supreme Court, filed May 23, 2024.

In 2023 the Texas legislature passed Senate Bill 1045. The bill creates a new system of “business courts” having jurisdiction of high-stakes business cases. Notably, the judges of these new trial courts are not elected but are appointed by the Governor. The bill also creates a new 15th Court of Appeals to hear appeals of such cases, as well as any case against the State, state agencies and state officials. This is the first case to challenge the constitutionality of SB 1045. Before the bill, suits against the State were filed in Austin and appeals went to the 3rd Court of Appeals in Austin.

Dallas County and others sued members of the Health and Human Services Commission in Travis County, alleging that HHSC has failed to timely transfer inmates from the Dallas County jail to state hospitals who have been held not competent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity, as required by law. The trial court denied the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction, and defendants appealed that ruling to the Austin Court of Appeals. The defendants filed a statement in that court indicating that, on September 1, 2024 (when the 15th Court of Appeals becomes effective), the appeal would be automatically transferred to the new 15th Court created by SB 1045, because the suit involves a case against state officials.

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Published on: May 17, 2024

Texas Supreme Court once again rules against royalty owners in post-production costs case

By John McFarland

Today the Texas Supreme Court decided Carl v. Hilcorp Energy Co, No. 24-0036. Its opinion addresses certified questions submitted to it by the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning a class action suit pending in that court.

The Carls’ lease provided for payment of gas royalty based on its “market value at the well.” The lease also provided that royalty must be paid on gas “sold or used off the premises.” Hilcorp used some of the gas produced “off the premises” to transport or process the gas produced from the lease. Hilcorp did not pay royalty on the gas used. The Texas Supreme Court agreed with Hilcorp that it owes no royalty on the gas used off the premises.

This is another in a long line of cases in which the Court relies on its flawed reasoning in Heritage Resources v. Nationsbank. The Court’s reasoning: because the measure of gas royalty is “market value at the well,” the lessor must bear its share of post-production costs. Hilcorp’s use of gas for post-production costs must therefore be part of the cost borne by the lessor. One way to do that is to not pay royalty on the gas used. So, even though the lease provides for royalty on gas “used off the premises,” Hilcorp need not pay royalty on such gas as long as it is used to enhance the value of the gas after it leaves the lease. If Hilcorp were to use some of the gas for other purposes, royalty would be due.

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Published on: April 19, 2024

DeVilliers Prevail in US Supreme Court

By John McFarland

Yesterday the US Supreme Court issued its opinion in DeVillier et al. v. Texas, No. 22-913, allowing 120 landowners to proceed with their takings claims against the State.

I wrote about this case when the Court agreed to hear it.

The Summary of facts in the Court’s Syllabus describes the issue:

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Published on: March 15, 2024

White v. Hilcorp – Heritage v. Nationsbank Again Rears its Ugly Head

By John McFarland

In January the US 5th Circuit Court of Appeals submitted a “certified question” to the Texas Supreme Court. Federal courts have jurisdiction over cases involving only state-law issues if the parties are from different states – diversity jurisdiction. This is one such case. Carl v. Hilcorp Energy Company, No. 24-0036.

The trustees of the Carl/White Trust sued Hilcorp Energy on behalf of royalty owners with language in their leases providing that the lessee must pay royalties on gas “sold or used off the premises.” The suit seeks class-action status on behalf of these royalty owners. The Trust’s lease also provides that royalty on gas should be paid on the “market value at the well.” Hilcorp moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that under a “market-value-at-the-well” lease, Hilcorp was allowed to deduct all post-production costs and therefore had no obligation to pay for gas used in processing. The trial court agreed with Hilcorp and dismissed the case; the Trust appealed to the 5th Circuit.

When a case in federal court is governed by state law, a federal appeals court may ask the state’s top court to opine on a question of law critical to its case – to submit the question as a “certified question” to the state court. The 5th Circuit did so here, asking the Texas Supreme Court: “can a market-value-at-the-well lease containing an off-lease-use-of-gas clause and a free-on-lease-use clause be interpreted to allow for the deduction of gas used off lease in the post-production process?” The Texas Supreme Court agreed to consider the question, and the parties have submitted briefs. Two amicus briefs, one from Texas Oil & Gas Association supporting Hilcorp’s arguments, and one by Texas Land & Mineral Association and National Association of Royalty Owners-Texas, Inc., supporting the Trusts’ arguments.

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Published on: January 17, 2024

Two Cases on Royalty Fractions

By John McFarland

This year the Texas Supreme Court decided Van Dyke v. The Navigator Group, trying to give some structure to cases construing conveyances and reservations of royalty interests-whether fixed or floating. I wrote about the case last February. Since then two court of appeals cases have grappled with the issue: Royalty Asset Holdings II, LP v. Bayswater Fund III-A LLC, in the El Paso Court of Appeals, No. 08-22-00108-CV; and Thomson v. Hoffman, in the San Antonio Court of Appeals, No. 04-19-00771-CV.

In Royalty Asset, the court construed the following royalty reservation:

EXCEPT that Grantors, for themselves and their heirs and assigns, retain, reserve and except from this conveyance and [sic] undivided 1/4th of the land owner’s usual 1/8th royalty interest (being a full 1/32nd royalty interest) payable or accruing under the terms of any existing or future oil, gas or mineral lease pertaining to or covering the oil, gas and other minerals on, in or under the above described [sic] land. It is distinctly understood and agreed that the interest in royalties hereby retained and reserved by Grantors does not participate in any bonus or delay rentals payable for or accruing under the terms of any such oil, gas and mineral lease or leases, and it shall not be necessary for Grantors to join in, execute or ratify any oil, gas and mineral lease covering said above described tract, the right and privilege to execute any oil, gas and mineral lease or leases covering the full mineral interest in the above described tract being hereby granted and conveyed to Grantees herein, their heirs and assigns.

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Published on: January 10, 2024

Gill v. Hill – Another Case on Due Process Requirements in a Tax Foreclosure

By John McFarland

Last year the Texas Supreme Court decided Mitchell v. MAP Resources, holding that a mineral owner whose interest was sold at a tax foreclosure could collaterally attack the judgment and introduce extrinsic evidence that he had not been properly served with notice of the suit and therefore was deprived of due process under the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution. Gill v. Hill is another such case. The El Paso Court of Appeals ruled against the plaintiff, with one judge dissenting. The Texas Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, where it is now pending.

The tax foreclosure in Gill v. Hill took place in 1999. Suit seeking to set aside the foreclosure was filed in 2019. The El Paso Court of Appeals distinguished the case from Mitchell v. MAP Resources. In both cases the taxpayer was served by posting on the courthouse door. In Mitchell, both sides moved for summary judgment, and the party seeking to set aside the foreclosure introduced extrinsic evidence that she could easily have been personally served because her name and address were in courthouse deed records and appraisal district records. In Gill v. Hill, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the suit was barred by limitations. The plaintiff alleged that he could have been personally served but did not move for summary judgment or introduce any extrinsic evidence.

The Court of Appeals held it was plaintiff’s burden to raise a fact issue on whether adequate notice of suit was given by introducing extrinsic evidence. The dissent would hold that the defendant had the burden on summary judgment to show that proper notice of the suit was given.

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