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Every oil company lease form will contain a pooling clause, and the rights granted to the Lessee by that clause can significantly affect the economic and other rights of the Lessor under the lease.  Every Lessor should therefore understand the concept of pooling.

The basic idea behind pooling is a good one, and its use can benefit both parties to the lease.  In all states, laws and regulations have been adopted governing the spacing of wells – how many wells can be drilled in a field and how far apart they must be from each other and from the lease line on which the well is located.  These regulations have been developed to prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells and to maximize the ultimate recovery of oil and gas from a field.  The spacing rules — often called “field rules” — may differ from field to field, depending on whether the field produces gas or oil and on the geological characteristics of the reservoir.  In Texas, the Texas Railroad Commission’s spacing rules require an oil company to have a minimum number of acres under lease and assigned to a well in order for the Commission to grant a permit to drill the well.  The acreage assigned to the well is called a “proration unit”  (not to be confused with a pooled unit). For most oil fields, the proration unit size is 40 acres.  For gas wells, the proration unit size can range from 40 acres to 640 acres, depending on the field rules for that field. For horizontal wells, the amount of acreage that must be (or can be) assigned to a well generally depends on the length of the productive lateral. The longer the lateral the more acreage can be assigned to the well.

Where mineral ownership is divided into small tracts, it may not be possible for a Lessee to obtain a permit to drill a well unless it can somehow combine the small tracts into a larger tract for purposes of assigning a proration unit to the well.  For example, if the proration unit size in a field is 160 acres but all of the tracts in the field are 40 acres or less, then the Lessee must combine several tracts into a single unit in order to drill a well.  Also, the tract boundaries in a field may not fit the spacing pattern for a field.  The best location to drill a well may be exactly on the boundary between two tracts.  In such a case, the best solution is to combine all or parts of the two adjacent tracts to form a single unit.  This combining of acreage is called pooling, and the units so created are called pooled units.

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Over the last 100 years courts have developed a body of case law in disputes between lessors and lessees of oil and gas leases. Courts have held that certain provisions are “implied” in the contracts, even though there is no language in the lease to support those provisions. The rationale behind these implied provisions goes back to cases interpreting hard mineral leases, and back to the cradle of the oil industry, Pennsylvania. The idea behind these implied provisions is that they are necessary for both parties to get the benefit of their bargain and to make the lease work as intended. Because the lessee has control over what operations are conducted under the lease, most of these implied provisions are intended to benefit the lessor, who generally has less bargaining power in negotiation of the lease and no say in whether and how the lease is developed.

An example: oil and gas leases generally provide that the lease will remain in effect for the primary term and for as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from the leased premises. Courts have implied a requirement that, for the lease to remain in effect, the production must be in “paying quantities.” The production must be sufficient for the lessee to realize a profit over operating costs.

Another example: what if the well on the lease temporarily ceases production at some point after the end of the primary term. Does the lease terminate even if the well can be repaired and restored to production? Courts developed the implied provision that a “temporary” cessation of production will not cause the lease to terminate, as long as the lessee acts with reasonable diligence to restore production.

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Last July the Fort Worth Court of Appeals decided City of Crowley v. TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. Last week the Texas Supreme Court denied the City’s petition for review. Another case in which Heritage v. NationsBank has raised its ugly head.

The City’s lease had the following provisions related to how its royalty should be calculated:

• The Lessee is to pay the Lessor “the Royalty Fraction of the market value at the point of sale, use, or other disposition” (the “Valuation Provision”);

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The following is from Michael Curry and Jacob Rolls. Michael Curry is an Austin lawyer who served as an adjunct professor at the University of Texas, where he got his law degree. Jacob Rolls, based in Driftwood, is a former public defender and trial consultant with a master’s degree in international relations. Both volunteer with Lawyers Defending American Democracy.

May 1 is Law Day, a day to focus the nation’s attention on the rule of law and the rights and freedoms it secures. That focus may seem abstract, but the rule of law is a foundational principle of our democracy — and arguably more threatened than ever.

The rule of law can be defined in different ways, but certain elements are fundamental. It is the principle that we are governed by published laws, not by the unchecked decisions of elected or appointed officials. John Adams said we are “a government of laws, and not of men.” In our system, the Constitution and laws apply to everyone, regardless of status or position, and are enforced by independent courts.

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On April 24, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in two consolidated appeals, Boren Descendants v. Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd., and Mabee Ranch Royalty Partnership LP v. Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd. I wrote about the Eastland Court of Appeals, decision in these cases in December 2024. The issue is construction of a 1933 deed of 60,000 acres in which the grantor reserved “an undivided one-fourth (1/4th) of the usual one eighth (1/8th) royalty.” Fasken owns the reserved royalty and the Boren and Mabee descendants on the fee mineral interest. Relying on the Supreme Court’s guidance on how to construe such deeds in Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, the Eastland Court held that the deed reserved a “floating” 1/4th of the royalty.

The more interesting part of the case is the applicability of the presumed grant doctrine, also addressed in Van Dyke. The appeal of the Fasken cases was a permissive interlocutory appeal; the Eastland Court refused to consider the the Boren and Mabee parties’ contention that the presumed grant doctrine applied, concluding that it was not one of the issues referred by the trial court for the interlocutory appeal.

The Supreme Court has elected to return the case to the Eastland Court for further proceedings. First, it told the Eastland Court that it should consider the Supreme Court’s more recent opinion in Clifton v. Johnson, which addressed a another fraction-of-royalty issue. Second, it said the Eastland Court should have considered the Boren and Mabee parties’ claim that the presumed grant doctrine applied.

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On March 3, 2026, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Fasken v. Puig, No. 24-1033. It reversed the courts below and held that the words “free of all costs” in a reservation of a non-participating royalty interest did not include post-production costs. The reservation, in a 1960 deed covering lands in Webb County, reads:

There is SAVED, EXCEPTED AND RESERVED, in favor of the undersigned, B. A. Puig, Jr., out of the above described property, an undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) of all the oil, gas and other minerals, except coal, in, to and under or that may be produced from the above described acreage, to be paid or delivered to Grantor, B. A. Puig, Jr., as his own property free of cost forever. Said interest hereby reserved is Non-Participating Royalty . . . .

In Chesapeake v. Hyder,  483 S.W.3d 870 (2016), the Texas Supreme Court ruled on a similar issue. The Hyders’ lease contained an unusual provision granting them an overriding royalty on production from horizontal wells the surface location of which was on the Hyders’ land but whose lateral produced from adjacent land. The reservation of overriding royalty provided that they would receive “a perpetual, cost-free (except only its portion of production taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5%) of gross production” from such wells. Chief Justice Hecht, joined by four other justices, held that the overriding royalty must be paid free of post-production costs. Justice Hecht said that “We disagree with the Hyders that ‘cost-free’ … cannot refer to production costs. … But Chesapeake must show that while the general term ‘cost-free’ does not distinguish between production and post-production costs and thus literally refers to all costs, it nevertheless cannot refer to post-production costs.”  Four justices dissented; they concluded that, because the overriding royalty was based on “gross production,” it was valued at the well, and so the Court’s prior decision in Heritage v. NationsBank meant that, not withstanding the cost-free language, post-production costs can be deducted.

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The only three essential terms of an oil and gas lease are the granting clause, including a description of the property, the habendum clause, which defines the term of the lease, and the royalty clause. The following would be a valid, enforceable lease:

John Doe hereby leases to Gusher Oil Company the oil and gas in and under Section 5, Block 4, T&N RR Co. Survey, Jones County, Texas, for the purpose of exploring for and producing oil and gas. This grant shall be for a term of three years and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from the property. John Doe reserves a royalty of 1/4th of all oil and gas produced and saved.

Dated ___________________, 2014

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On December 2, 2025, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Clifton v. Johnson, No. 23-067. This is the first Supreme Court case on fixed vs. floating since its decision Van Dyke v. The Navigator Group, 668 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. 2023), its effort to clarify how double-fraction conveyances and reservations should be construed.

The reservation construed in Van Dyke was a mineral reservation:

It is understood and agreed that one-half of one-eighth of all minerals and mineral rights in said land are reserved in grantors … and are not conveyed herein.

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The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, in Devon Energy Production Co. v. Robert Leon Oliver, No. 13-25-00131-CV, has reversed a $9 million judgment against Devon in a suit for failure to pay royalties in accordance with Oliver’s leases. The court followed the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court’s opinions in Heritage Resources v. NationsBank, 989 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996), holding that Oliver’s lease provision prohibiting post-production-cost deductions from Oliver’s royalty was “surplusage,” and that Oliver’s royalty should be based on the “market value at the well.”

Oliver’s leases were on a printed form with an addendum that provided the addendum’s provisions would prevail over any conflicting language in the leases. The royalty clause in the lease form provided that the royalty on oil would be

1/5th of all oil produced and saved by lessee from said  land, or from time to time, at the option of lessee, to pay lessor the average posted market price of such 1/5th part of such oil at the wells as of the day it is run to the pipeline or storage tanks, lessor’s interest, in either case, to bear 1/5th of the cost of treating oil to render it marketable pipeline oil. …

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John McFarland
 Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, P.C.
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