Articles Posted in Recent Cases

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   Suppose that the fluids injected into a disposal well migrate beyond the boundary of the tract where the well is located; does that incursion of the injected fluids into and under the neighbor’s property constitute a trespass?  Until recently, this question had never been addressed by a Texas appellate court, and the assumption in the disposal industry was that such incursion was not actionable. The Beaumont Court of Appeals, in FPL Farming Ltd. (“FPL”) v. Environmental Processing Systems, L.C. (“EPS”), concluded that the neighbor does have a trespass claim. 

  The Beaumont Court of Appeals has issued two opinions in the case; the first was appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals, and the second has also been appealed to the Supreme Court, where it is now pending. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems, L.C., 305 S.W.3d 739 (Tex.App.-Beaumont), reversed and remanded 351 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2011), on remand 383 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.App.-Beaumont May 24, 2012, pet. filed 1/18/13).  

  The facts in FPL are these:  EPS operates an injection well for non-hazardous waste on land adjacent to the land owned by FPL. FPL previously objected to an amendment of EPS’s permit that increased the rate and volumes allowed to be injected. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed the permit amendment over FPL’s objections, ruling that “the amended permits do not impair FPL’s existing or intended use of the deep subsurface.” FPL Farming Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 2003 WL 247183 (Austin 2003, pet. denied).

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Lawsuits against Chesapeake Exploration for wrongfully deducting post-production costs from its gas royalty payments are hitting a boiling-point. Suits are being pursued against the company in every jurisdiction where it operates, including Texas, Arkansas, Lousiana, Kansas, Ohio, West Virginia, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. Chesapeake has recently been much more aggressive in deducting post-production costs. In the Barnett Shale in North Texas, its post-production cost deductions have been as much as $.70 to $1.00 per mcf, and with such low gas prices, some royalty owners’ payments have been halved by such deductions. Chesapeake’s royalty payments in North Texas have reportedly been on a net price of as little as eleven cents per mcf, and as little as 11% of the price other producers have based their royalty payments on. A recent Bloomberg article summarizes Chesapeake’s royalty payment practices.

Chesapeake has settled some claims, including large royalty owner claims in Pennsylvania. Chesapeake’s marketing practices in Pennsylvania mirror those it uses in the Barnett Shale.  Last year, Chesapeake settled a claim brought by the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport for underpayment of royalties for $5 million. The Bass family in Fort Worth recently sued the company for wrongfully deducting post-production costs.

Chesapeake’s tactics for how it calculates its royalties cannot be understood without knowing something about how Texas courts have addressed deductibility of post-production costs. I have previously written three posts on this topic that can be seen here, here and here.

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The Texas Railroad Commissioners voted unanimously today to reject the recommendation of its examiners denying EOG’s allocation well permit and instructed the examiners to prepare an order and findings granting EOG’s permit.  For my prior posts about this case, see here, here and here.

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Julia Trigg Crawford has waged a well-publicized fight to prevent condemnation of an easement across her farm for the XL Keystone Pipeline.  On August 27, the 6th Court of Appeals in Texarkana denied her appeal of TransCanada Keystone Pipeline’s award of an easement over her property.  Crawford has vowed to appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.

The Court of Appeals’ opinion says that Ms. Crawford had two arguments: first, that the Texas statutes granting pipelines condemnation authority do not apply to interstate pipelines; and second, that Keystone had failed to meet the showing required by the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Riceland Partners v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, 363 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. 2012) that the pipeline must show “a reasonable probability … that the pipeline will at some point after construction serve the public by transporting gas for one or more customers who will either retain ownership of their gas or sell it to parties other than the carrier.” The Texarkana court held that Keystone had met that burden. The court also held that the relevant Texas statutes do grant condemnation authority to interstate common carrier pipelines.

The portion of the XL Keystone pipeline from Cushing, Oklahoma to Port Arthur, Texas is nearing completion.  That segment of the pipeline has been able to proceed even though the Obama administration has not yet approved the segment of the system that would carry heavy crude from Canada across the northern segment of the XL Pipeline system.

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For those following the Klotzman protest of EOG’s allocation well permit (our firm represents the protestants), here are the exceptions to the examiners’ proposal for decision filed by EOG and by Intervenors Devon, Pioneer, Laredo Petroleum and BP America:

EOG Exceptions to PFD.pdf

Devon et al Exceptions to PFD.pdf

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The examiners who heard the Klotzmans’ protest of EOG Resources’ application for an allocation well permit have issued their Proposal for Decision in the case. A copy of the PFD can be viewed here:  2013-06-25 PFD EOG Klotzman (2).pdf  Our firm represents the protestants in the case. For my prior discussion of the case and allocation well permits, see here and here and here. The parties now have until July 10 to file exceptions to the proposal, and replies to exceptions are due within 10 days thereafter. After that, if no changes to the PFD are made, it will go before the Railroad Commissioners for their decision.

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Last Friday, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of XTO in its battle with Homer Merriman over whether XTO’s well should have been moved so as to accommodate his cattle-working operation.

I wrote about this case when the Supreme Court decided to hear it. Mr. Merriman owns 40 acres in Limestone County. When he bought the land, the seller reserved the mineral estate and the land was then subject to an oil and gas lease. Merriman built his home on the land. Although he works full-time as a pharmacist, Merriman also runs cattle. He leases land in Limestone County for grazing, and once a year he uses his 40 acres to round up and work his cattle, with portable pens that are assembled for the operation and then taken down. The rest of the year he grazes cattle on the 40 acres, where he also lives.

In 2007, XTO Energy approached Mr. Merriman and told him it intended to drill a well on his tract. Merriman objected to the proposed well location, arguing that it would prevent him from using the 40 acres for his cattle working operations. XTO discussed with Merriman moving the location to the southwest corner of his tract, where Merriman said it would be acceptable, but XTO ultimately decided not to accommodate Merriman’s request. Merriman then sued XTO seeking an injunction to prevent the drilling of the well at its chosen location. Despite the suit, XTO drilled the well. The trial court granted summary judgment for XTO, and the Waco Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Merriman “has alternative uses of his land that are not impracticable or unreasonable. Merriman further has alternative methods of conducting his cattle operation [on other lands] that are not impracticable or unreasonable.”

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The Texas Supreme Court has recently refused to hear Friddle v. Fisher, 378 S.W.3d 475 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2012). The court of appeals’ opinion has an interesting discussion of the duties of a mineral owner to owners of non-participating royalty interests burdening the mineral estate and of the application of the discovery rule to claims that such duties were breached.

These are the facts of the case:  In 1949, M.L. Friddle conveyed 84.7 acres in Hopkins County to Barney Martin, reserving 1/4 of the royalty. The reserved royalty interest later came to be owned by M.L. Friddle’s son Marvin.  In 1995, Barney Martin conveyed 1/4 of the royalty in the 84.7 acres to Mable Robinson, and 1/4 of the royalty to Helen Warde. The following day, Martin conveyed the land to Fred and Ruth Fisher.  Later, Marvin Friddle acquired from Mable Robinson and Helen Warde the royalty interests that were conveyed to them. So, at the time this controversy arose, the Fishers owned the land and minerals, subject to a NPRI owned by Marvin equal to 3/4 of the royalty.

In 1998, the Fishers signed an oil and gas lease on the 84.7 acres, reserving a 1/8 royalty. Valence Operating Company formed a pooled unit, the Ames-Antrim Gas Unit, and pooled the 84.7 acres into the unit. Valence drilled a well on the unit, but the well was not located on the 84.7 acres. Neither Valence nor the Fishers notified Marvin of the granting of the lease, the formation of the pooled unit, or the drilling of the well. Valence paid all of the royalty attributable to the 84.7 acres to the Fishers.

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John McFarland
 Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, P.C.
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