Oil and Gas Lawyer BlogThe examiners who heard the Klotzmans’ protest of EOG Resources’ application for an allocation well permit have issued their Proposal for Decision in the case. A copy of the PFD can be viewed here: 2013-06-25 PFD EOG Klotzman (2).pdf Our firm represents the protestants in the case. For my prior discussion of the case and allocation well permits, see here and here and here. The parties now have until July 10 to file exceptions to the proposal, and replies to exceptions are due within 10 days thereafter. After that, if no changes to the PFD are made, it will go before the Railroad Commissioners for their decision.
Articles Posted in Recent Cases
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Merriman v. XTO Energy – Supreme Court’s Latest on Accommodation Doctrine
Last Friday, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of XTO in its battle with Homer Merriman over whether XTO’s well should have been moved so as to accommodate his cattle-working operation.
I wrote about this case when the Supreme Court decided to hear it. Mr. Merriman owns 40 acres in Limestone County. When he bought the land, the seller reserved the mineral estate and the land was then subject to an oil and gas lease. Merriman built his home on the land. Although he works full-time as a pharmacist, Merriman also runs cattle. He leases land in Limestone County for grazing, and once a year he uses his 40 acres to round up and work his cattle, with portable pens that are assembled for the operation and then taken down. The rest of the year he grazes cattle on the 40 acres, where he also lives.
In 2007, XTO Energy approached Mr. Merriman and told him it intended to drill a well on his tract. Merriman objected to the proposed well location, arguing that it would prevent him from using the 40 acres for his cattle working operations. XTO discussed with Merriman moving the location to the southwest corner of his tract, where Merriman said it would be acceptable, but XTO ultimately decided not to accommodate Merriman’s request. Merriman then sued XTO seeking an injunction to prevent the drilling of the well at its chosen location. Despite the suit, XTO drilled the well. The trial court granted summary judgment for XTO, and the Waco Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Merriman “has alternative uses of his land that are not impracticable or unreasonable. Merriman further has alternative methods of conducting his cattle operation [on other lands] that are not impracticable or unreasonable.”
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Friddle v. Fisher – Duty of Owner of Executive Rights to Royalty Owners
The Texas Supreme Court has recently refused to hear Friddle v. Fisher, 378 S.W.3d 475 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2012). The court of appeals’ opinion has an interesting discussion of the duties of a mineral owner to owners of non-participating royalty interests burdening the mineral estate and of the application of the discovery rule to claims that such duties were breached.
These are the facts of the case: In 1949, M.L. Friddle conveyed 84.7 acres in Hopkins County to Barney Martin, reserving 1/4 of the royalty. The reserved royalty interest later came to be owned by M.L. Friddle’s son Marvin. In 1995, Barney Martin conveyed 1/4 of the royalty in the 84.7 acres to Mable Robinson, and 1/4 of the royalty to Helen Warde. The following day, Martin conveyed the land to Fred and Ruth Fisher. Later, Marvin Friddle acquired from Mable Robinson and Helen Warde the royalty interests that were conveyed to them. So, at the time this controversy arose, the Fishers owned the land and minerals, subject to a NPRI owned by Marvin equal to 3/4 of the royalty.
In 1998, the Fishers signed an oil and gas lease on the 84.7 acres, reserving a 1/8 royalty. Valence Operating Company formed a pooled unit, the Ames-Antrim Gas Unit, and pooled the 84.7 acres into the unit. Valence drilled a well on the unit, but the well was not located on the 84.7 acres. Neither Valence nor the Fishers notified Marvin of the granting of the lease, the formation of the pooled unit, or the drilling of the well. Valence paid all of the royalty attributable to the 84.7 acres to the Fishers.
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Texas Supreme Court Set to Again Address Accommodation Doctrine
The Texas Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments in a case that could have important implications for landowners and oil and gas exploration companies: Merriman v. XTO Energy, No. 11-0494. Merriman’s attorneys are asking the Court to reverse the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, at Waco, which they contend has consistently mis-interpreted the Supreme Court’s rulings on the accommodation doctrine.
The “accommodation doctrine” is a court-made doctrine relating to the mineral owner’s right to use the surface estate to drill for and produce minerals. The mineral estate is the “dominant estate,” meaning that the owner of the mineral estate has the right to use so much of the surface estate as is reasonably necessary for exploration and development of the minerals, without compensation to the surface owner for such use. (This includes the right to use groundwater for oil and gas operations, even though the groundwater belongs to the owner of the surface estate.) The Supreme Court has held that, notwithstanding the mineral owner’s right to use the surface, the mineral owner must under some circumstances “accommodate” the surface owner’s existing use of his land. The doctrine requires a balancing of the interests of the surface and mineral owner. In 1993, the Supreme Court said: “if the mineral owner has reasonable alternative uses of the surface, one of which permits the surface owner to continue to use the surface in the manner intended (especially when there is only one reasonable manner in which the surface may be used) and one of which would preclude that use by the surface owner, the mineral owner must use the alternative that allows continued use of the surface by the surface owner.” Tarrant County Water Control & Impr. Dist. No. 1 v. Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. 1993).
Homer Merriman, the plaintiff in this case, owns 40 acres in Limestone County. When he bought the land, the seller reserved the mineral estate and the land was then subject to an oil and gas lease. Merriman built his home on the land. Although he works full-time as a pharmacist, Merriman also runs cattle. He leases land in Limestone County for grazing, and once a year he uses his 40 acres to round up and work his cattle, with portable pens that are assembled for the operation and then taken down. The rest of the year he grazes cattle on the 40 acres, where he also lives.
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More About Allocation Wells
In a prior post, I wrote about a new development at the Texas Railroad Commission: granting permits for “allocation wells” – horizontal wells drilled across lease lines without pooling the leases. Since I wrote that post, our firm was retained to represent the parties protesting EOG Resources’ application for a permit for an allocation well. A hearing on the application was held at the RRC on December 3. In addition to EOG and the protestants, Devon Energy appeared at the hearing supporting EOG, and the Texas General Land Office appeared opposing allocation wells on State-owned minerals. All parties have now submitted closing statements and responses, which can be viewed below:
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Another Chapter in Jimmy McAllen’s Long-Running Case Against Forest Oil
Last week, a Texas district court ruled that Jimmy McAllen could keep his $20 million arbitration award against Forest Oil Corp. This fight goes back to 1992, when Forest Oil gave McAllen used drilling pipe to build animal enclosures on his exotic wildlife ranch, on which McAllen kept rhinoceroses. The pipe had scale that contained radioactive materials, and McAllen claimed that it made the animals ill. McAllen also contracted cancer, which he blamed on the pipe. McAllen also alleged that Forest secretly buried mercury, drilling waste and other radioactive material on his property. McAllen sued Forest in 2005. Forest claimed that McAllen was required to arbitrate the dispute under the terms of a prior settlement agreement between Forest and McAllen arising out of a suit for unpaid royalties. Forest’s argument eventually made it to the Texas Supreme Court, which held that the prior settlement agreement was binding on McAllen and required him to arbitrate the dispute. Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. 2008).
The case then went to an arbitration panel consisting of Houston attorney Daryl Bristow and South Texas attorneys Clayton J. Hoover and Donato D. Ramos. On February 29, 2012, the panel issued a split decision, 2-1, awarding McAllen $21.9 million plus $5 million in attorneys’ fees and additional injunctive relief requiring Forest to post a $10 million bond for the life of the lease to assure cleanup of any pollution found on the ranch. In a 40-page dissent, Daryl Bristow said that the panel’s award “turn[ed] the law on its ear” and “fabricate[s] a damages number without any principled foundation in the record.”
Forest then filed suit to overturn the award. On September 19, Judge Jeff Shadwick, of the 55th District Court in Harris County, denied Forest’s motion to overturn the award. The court’s order said that “the panel reached its conclusions based on little to no admissible evidence,” but that this “is one of the unfortunate hazards of arbitration.” “The court is not at liberty to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrators merely because it would have reached a different decision.” Judge Shadwick did overturn the arbitration panel’s requirement that Forest post a bond for future cleanup, saying that the panel had no jurisdiction to issue such relief.
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5th Circuit Affirms $20 million Judgment Against Chesapeake
The 5th Circuit affirmed a judgment today against Chesapeake Exploration for $19,951,004 in favor of Peak Energy Corporation, for breach of a contract to purchase oil and gas leases in the Haynesville Shale area of Harrison County, Texas. Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, No. 11-41003. The Court’s summary of the case:
In July 2008 Chesapeake Exploration LLC entered into an agreement to purchase deep rights held by Peak Energy Corporation in certain oil and gas leases in the Haynesville Shale formation, for the hefty sum of $15,000 per acre. When the price of natural gas plummeted several months later, Chesapeake refused to honor its commitment. In response to the complaint filed by Peak it contended that the parties’ agreement was unenforceable under the Texas statute of frauds, fatally indefinite, and that the plaintiffs had failed to tender performance. The district court disagreed, rendering judgment in favor of Peak and its principals and awarding them damages in the amount of $19,951,004, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Finding no error, we affirm.
In 2008, gas prices were high and the boom was on in the Haynesville Shale. Chesapeake was buying all of the acreage it could find. Its brokers identified leases covering 5,405 acres in Harrison County, Texas owned by Peak Energy, and on July 2, Chesapeake sent Peak a letter offering to buy all rights in its leases below the base of the Cotton Valley formation for $15,000 per net acre, with Peak delivering a 75% net revenue interest and reserving an overriding royalty on any excess over 75%. A map generated by Chesapeake was attached to the letter agreement showing the tracts Chesapeake had identified in which Peak had leases. The letter said that it was a “valid and binding agreement,” and that the closing would occur on August 31. Peak signed and returned the letter.
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Texas Supreme Court Reverses Two Jury Verdicts for Landowners in Condemnation Cases
The Texas Supreme Court issued two important condemnation cases on the last day of its term, both reversing judgments after jury trials in condemnation suits.
In City of Austin v. Harry M. Whittington, the court resolved the Whittington’s ten-year battle with the City over condemnation of a city block adjacent to the City’s convention center. The jury found that the City’s determination that its condemnation of the property was for a “public use” was fraudulent, in bad faith, and arbitrary and capricious. The Court said that “the Whittingtons do not dispute the underlying facts on these issues; rather, they dispute the legal effect of those facts (e.g., whether those facts amount to fraud, bad faith, or arbitrariness and capriciousness). Because these issues are legal questions, we review them de novo.” In other words, the Court held that it was not bound to support the jury’s verdict, but could look at the evidence and decide for itself. It decided that the evidence did not show that the City was guilty of fraud, bad faith, or arbitrary or capricious behavior. The City condemned the block for a private developer to build a parking garage for the convention center. Two Justices dissented. (My firm represented the Whittingtons in this case.)
In Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas) L.P. v. Avinger Timber, the jury awarded Avinger $20,955,000 for Enbridge’s condemnation of a site owned by Avinger on which a gas processing plant was located. The site was subject to a long-term lease that expired, and when the parties were unable to agree on terms for extension of the lease, Enbridge sued to condemn the property. The issue on appeal was whether the testimony of the valuation experts for Enbridge and Avinger was admissible. The Court held that both experts’ testimony was inadmissible and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. The Court held that the landowner’s appraiser violated the “value-to-the-taker” rule–meaning that he impermissibly took into account the unique value of the land to the condemning gas processing company (as opposed to considering the value to a hypothetical willing buyer, as the law requires). In particular, the appraiser had taken into account the cost to the company of removing the plant on the land if it were sold; the Court held that the appraiser should not have factored in those costs because that was a cost unique to the condemnor and not one that impacted the value of the land to a potential buyer.
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Texas Supreme Court Affirms its Decision in Denbury Pipeline Case
This week, the Texas Supreme Court denied Denbury Green Pipeline’s motion for rehearing in Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury, leaving essentially untouched its conclusion that pipelines must prove that they serve the public in order to exercise eminent domain power.
I wrote about this case a couple of weeks ago. See my prior discussion here. Pipeline companies had deluged the Court with briefs after its initial opinion, claiming that the Court’s decision will halt pipeline construction across the state.
While denying Denbury’s motion for rehearing, the Court did issue a revised opinion that made some changes to its language. The Court’s opinion adds language responding to some of the arguments of the friend-of-the-court briefs filed by other pipeline companies; and the revised opinion changes the holding as follows:
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Texas Supreme Court (finally) Decides EAA v. Day – a Victory for Landowners?
The Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion today in Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, more than a year after it was argued and some thirteen years after the controversy began. It has been eagerly awaited as the court’s ruling on whether a landowner has a “vested” right in groundwater under his/her land. The Court held that groundwater, like oil and gas, is “an exclusive and private property right … inhering in virtue of [the landowner’s] proprietorship of the land, and of which he may not be deprived without a taking of private property.” The case is being heralded by property rights advocates as a victory for private property rights. The court’s decision, in an opinion by Justice Nathan Hecht, was unanimous.
The opinion is certainly not surprising. It would have been a surprise to most people to learn that they do not have ownership rights in groundwater under their property. But I question whether it is such a victory for property owners and whether it will materially change the current regulatory scheme for groundwater in Texas.
Justice Hecht’s opinion, 49 pages, includes a good summary of the history of groundwater regulation and litigation in Texas over the last 100 years. Remarkably, in all that time the Court had never ruled on the question of whether landowners have a property right in groundwater. The court held that the same rules should apply to groundwater as apply to oil and gas – in both, the landowner has an ownership right in the substance under his/her land, subject to being divested of that ownership by drainage from wells on adjacent lands, and subject to reasonable regulation by the state.