Articles Posted in Recent Cases

Jarndyce v. Jarndyce is a fictional court case in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House, an interminable suit over a large inheritance.  The case itself is a principal character in the book. Dickens wrote in Bleak House:

Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, over the course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce without knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the suit. The little plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away into the other world. Fair wards of court have faded into mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has come in and gone out.

A recent case filed in the Texas Supreme Court, In re: Occidental Chemical Corporation, et al., No. 18-0660, reminded me of Jarndyce.  The origin of the case is a dispute between San Patricio County and Nueces County over the boundary between them, which began in 1972, when San Patricio County sued Nueces County in Refugio County to establish their common boundary. (The Texas legislature, in its wisdom, enacted a statute requiring boundary suits between counties to be filed an an adjacent county, so as to avoid possible prejudice by judges in either of the warring counties.)  Two rulings were made by the district court in Refugio County, one on May 31, 1989 (not a typo), and one on April 11, 2003. The court established the boundary between the two counties at the shoreline of San Patricio County, and the court held that “past and future natural and artificial modifications to the shoreline of San Patricio County shall form a part of San Patricio County.”  Those judgments became final. Case finally resolved, right?

In U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC v. Laborde Properties, L.P., the Texas Supreme Court grappled again with a royalty reservation. In a 1951 deed, the grantors reserved the following:

There is reserved and excepted from this conveyance unto the grantors herein, their heirs and assigns, an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to the Oil Royalty, Gas Royalty and Royalty in other Minerals in and under or that may be produced or mined from the above described premises, the same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16) of the production. This reservation is what is generally termed a non-participating Royalty Reservation.

The Bryans, who owned the reserved royalty, sued Laborde Properties, which owned the minerals subject to the reserved royalty, to determine whether the clause reserved 1/2 of the royalty or a 1/16 royalty.  The Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that the clause reserved 1/2 of the royalty – a “floating” royalty.

Last week the Texas Supreme Court agreed to hear Texas Outfitters Limited v. Carolyn Grace Nicholson, No. 17-059, from the San Antonio Court of Appeals. I wrote about this case when the Court of Appeals decided it last year.  Interesting facts. The issue is whether the holder of executive rights can be liable for refusing to lease.  The courts below said yes and awarded the plaintiff $867,000 in lost bonus money.  Briefs on the merits have already been filed. No date yet for oral argument. The Court of Appeals’ opinion may be found here.

On April 27 the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Perryman v. Spartan Texas Six Capital Partners, Ltd., No. 16-0804. The dispute was over ownership of the royalty interest in 206 acres of land in Montague County and construction of a royalty reservation in a conveyance of the property.  The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s and court of appeals’ construction of the deed reservation and with the construction argued by both sides in the dispute.  The case illustrates the need to be clear in drafting deed reservations and exceptions.

In 1977, Ben Perryman conveyed the 207 acres to his son and daughter-in-law, Gary and Nancy Perryman. The deed contains the following:

LESS, SAVE AND EXCEPT an undivided one-half (1/2) of all royalties from the production of oil, gas and/or other minerals that may be produced from the above described premises which are now owned by Grantor.

Lona Hills Ranch, LLC v. Creative Oil & Gas Operating, LLC, et al., No. 03-17-00743-CV, Austin Court of Appeals.

Creative Oil & Gas held an oil and gas lease on Lona Hills Ranch’s property. Lona Hills concluded that the lease had expired, but Creative disagreed and filed for a permit to drill a new well on the lease. Lona Hills protested the permit on the ground that the lease had expired. But the Texas Railroad Commission ruled that Creative had a “good-faith claim” that its lease was still in effect and granted the permit. So Lona Hills sued Creative in Lee County for trespass and trespass to try title on the ground that the lease had expired.

In response to Lona Hills’ suit Creative filed counterclaims for breach of the lease “by wrongfully claiming the Lease has terminated and wrongfully repudiating the Lease.” Lona Hills then filed a motion to dismiss Creative’s counterclaims under Texas’ Anti-SLAPP statute, the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code Chapter 27. Continue reading →