Conveyances of minerals in Texas usually describe the interest conveyed or reserved as an interest in “oil, gas or other minerals.” Texas courts have struggled mightily to try to discern what the parties meant by the term “other minerals.” If the parties did not specifically name a particular mineral, such as coal or uranium, did they intend that substance to be included in their reference to “other minerals”?
Making the matter more complicated, the Texas Supreme Court has changed its mind on how to approach the problem. At one point, the Court adopted a “surface destruction test” to determine whether a substance was intended to be a “mineral.” Under this rule, the Court reasoned that the parties would not intend to sever ownership of a substance from the surface estate if the commercial way to mine the mineral was by strip mining, so a near-surface substance would not be considered a “mineral.” Then the Court decided that such a test was not workable, and it adopted (but only for reservations or conveyances of “other minerals” after the date of its opinion) a different test, the “ordinary and natural meaning” test. Under this test, a substance is a mineral if it is within the “ordinary and natural meaning” of the word “mineral.” In effect, each substance must be tested by litigation to determine if it is a “mineral” within the ordinary and natural meaning of that term. Once a court has decided that a particular substance is a mineral under this test, it is a mineral for all reservations and conveyances of “oil, gas and other minerals” to which the test applies..
Because of all of the confusion about the term, I have created a short-hand decision tree to use when looking at a conveyance or reservation, to help me remember how to apply these tests. My decision tree is below.
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