Recent Cases

Published on: March 8, 2023

Railroad Commission v. Apache – The Issue of Standing

Recently the US Supreme Court heard argument in Biden v. Nebraska, in which several states challenge the President’s authority to forgive student loans. Lost in much of the coverage was the administration’s challenge to the states’ standing to bring the case. “Standing” is a difficult concept to get your arms around. Courts cannot issue advisory opinions. Under Article III of the US Constitution, courts can decide only a “case or controversy.” That means the plaintiff must have a stake in the outcome different from the general public. To have standing, a plaintiff must have sustained or be threatened with an injury different from or in addition to the general public. The Biden administration argued that the states who sued would not suffer any injury because of Biden’s forgiveness of student loans, and therefore do not have standing to sue.

The concept of standing is important to the separation of powers in our federal and state judicial systems. It is a check on the power of courts. Nebraska could not simply ask the court to declare Biden’s loan forgiveness an unconstitutional exercise of executive power without first showing how the state would be injured by Biden’s action. Such an opinion would be an “advisory opinion.”

What does this have to do with Railroad Commission v. Apache?

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Published on: February 17, 2023

Van Dyke v. The Navigator Group – Double Fractions and the Presumed Grant Doctrine

By John McFarland

Today the Texas Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Van Dyke v. The Navigator Group, resolving a ten-year dispute over the ownership of royalty interests and $44 million in royalties.

In 1924, the Mulkeys conveyed their ranch to White and Tom, with the following reservation:

It is understood and agreed that one-half of one-eighth of all minerals and mineral rights in said land are reserved in grantors … and are not conveyed herein.

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Published on: February 13, 2023

“whether or not in paying quantities”

By John McFarland

Last year the 14th Court of Appeals in Houston issue an opinion that should serve as a warning to mineral owners, Thistle Creek Ranch v. Ironroc Energy Partners, No. 14-20-00347-CV.

Thistle Creek sued IronRoc to terminate an oil and gas lease it claimed had expired for lack of production in paying quantities. The lease is on a form I have seen before. The habendum clause provides:

Unless sooner terminated or longer kept in force under other provisions hereof, this lease shall remain in force for a term of three (3) years from the date hereof, hereinafter called “primary term,” and as long thereafter as operations, as hereinafter defined, are conducted upon said land with no cessation for more than ninety (90) consecutive days.

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Published on: January 6, 2023

Davis v. JD Minerals: another fixed vs floating royalty dispute

By John McFarland

Last month the El Paso Court of Appeals issued its opinion in a long-running dispute over royalties on a section of land in Upton County. Davis et al. v. COG Operating, LLC, et al., No. 08-20-00205-CV. The court addressed several issues, one of which was the construction of a 1939 deed that reserved a royalty interest described as “one-fourth of the 1/8 royalty usually reserved by and to be paid to the land owner in event of execution of oil and gas leases, so that 1/4 of the 1/8 royalty to be paid to us, our heirs or assigns, if, as and when produced from the above described land ….” The court concluded that this was a “floating” royalty equal to 1/4th of the royalty reserved in the lease, not a fixed 1/4 of 1/8 royalty. This appears to be the correct result based on other recent cases construing similar language.

I have a bone to pick, however, with the language in the opinion describing the royalty reserved. To be fair, other courts have made the same error, and the same error was made by the appellants in their brief. The court concluded that the grantors reserved “a floating, 1/4 NPRI in Section 45.” A 1/4 NPRI is a 1/4th royalty interest, not 1/4th of the royalty reserved in the lease. A 1/4th royalty is equivalent to one out of every four barrels produced. One-fourth of the royalty under a lease reserving a 1/4th royalty is 1/4 of 1/4, or 1/16 royalty interest, not a 1/4th NPRI. Clearly, in using the term “floating, 1/4 NPRI” the court meant to conclude that the deed reserved 1/4th of the royalty reserved in any future lease. But referring to it as a 1/4 NPRI is confusing.

Published on: December 20, 2022

Year in Review: Significant Cases and Events

By John McFarland

Winter Storm Uri

The fallout from the Texas Freeze in February 2021 continues. A year later, UT’s Austin Energy Institute concluded that multiple failures of power plants, gas processing plants, gas storage and distribution facilities, and gas production all contributed to the system failures. ERCOT management was fired; natural gas prices spiked to more than $400/MMBtu; politicians blamed wind and solar generation; the legislature passed legislation requiring the Public Utility Commission and the Railroad Commission to strengthen weatherization requirements for production, processing and generation facilities and has since criticized those agencies for failing to fix the problem. ERCOT drastically raised electricity prices during the storm, resulting in multiple bankruptcies. The legislature provided for securitization of about $7 billion in private losses caused by the storm, so those losses are spread over the next twenty years in customer rate increases. Expect new legislation in the upcoming session.

Mitchell v. Map Resources, 649 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. 2022)

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Published on: December 5, 2022

Hahn v. ConocoPhillips — another case on fractional vs. fraction of royalty

By John McFarland

Last week the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals issued a decision on a long-running dispute over reservation of a royalty interest in a deed. This is the court’s second opinion in the case.

In the court’s first opinion in 2018, the court construed the following royalty reservation:

SAVE AND EXCEPT and there is hereby reserved to [Hahn] herein, his heirs and assigns, an undivided one-half (1/2) non-participating interest in and to all of the royalty [Hahn] now owns, (same being an undivided one-half (1/2) of [Hahn’s] one-fourth (1/4) or an undivided one-eighth (1/8) royalty) in and to all of the oil royalty, gas royalty and royalty in other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the herein described property.

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Published on: November 8, 2022

EnerVest v. Mayfield – another loss for royalty owners on post-production costs

By John McFarland

Mayfield and Ingham leased several sections in Sutton County to EnerVest. EnerVest produces gas which goes to a gas plant for processing and pays royalty on the residue gas and natural gas liquids, after deducting post-production costs. The gas must be compressed and dehydrated before sale, and EnerVest does not pay royalty on the fuel used in compression and dehydration. Mayfield and Ingham sued EnerVest seeking royalties on the fuel gas.

The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that, under the lease royalty provisions, EnerVest does not owe royalties on fuel gas. EnerVest v. Mayfield, No. 04-21-00337-CV.

The lease provides for payment “on gas produced from said land and sold or used off the premises, … the market value at the mouth of the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used.” Another lease clause provides:

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Published on: October 3, 2022

Who owns rights to store oil in an underground salt cavern?

By John McFarland

Last June the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals decided that the right to store oil in a salt cavern belongs to the surface owner. In Myers-Woodward, LLC v. Underground Services Markham, LLC, et al., No. 13-20-00172-CV, the court addressed a dispute between Myers-Woodward, which owned the surface estate and a royalty on minerals, including salt, in a tract in which Underground Services owned the salt. Underground Services mined and sold salt by solution-mining from a salt cavern under the land. Myers-Woodward disputed how Underground calculated its royalties on the salt. Underground also asserted that, as owner of the salt, it has the right to use the resulting salt cavern to store hydrocarbons. The court ruled in favor of Underground on its method of determining the royalties owed, but it ruled in favor of Myers-Underwood on the right to use the resulting salt cavern, holding that Myers-Underwood held the storage rights, a part of its rights as owner of the surface estate.

Underground cited Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 808 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.App.–Beaumont 1991), rev’d on other grounds 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex 1991), in support of its claim to storage rights. Mapco has often been cited as lending uncertainty to the issue of whether the surface owner owns the pore space under its land. The Beaumont court in Mapco, without citing any authority, held that the mineral owner had storage rights for underground storage facilities. After reviewing other authority, the Corpus Christi court concluded that, contrary to Mapco, “the well-recognized, decisional law states that the mineral estate owner owns the minerals but not the subsurface. … Therefore, we decline to follow Mapco in this case.”

Storage rights have become a more important issue recently with the advent of CO2 sequestration projects in Texas. Although the court did not cite Lightning Oil v. Anadarko, Lightning would seem to support its conclusion as well.

Published on: September 23, 2022

Ridgefield Permian v. Diamondback: To what interest does a tax lien on a royalty reserved in an oil and gas lease attach?

By John McFarland

Ridgefield Permian v. Diamondback is another case arising out of the same tax foreclosure suit that was addressed in Mitchell v. MAP Resources, decided earlier this year by the Texas Supreme Court. My discussion of Mitchell can be found here. Both Ridgefield and Mitchell were initially decided by the El Paso Court of Appeals. While Mitchell’s appeal to the Supreme Court was pending the El Paso Court handed down its opinion in Ridgefield, 2021 WL 1783260 (May 5, 2021). In Ridgefield, the El Paso Court held that the taxing authorities’ lien attached only to the royalty interest reserved in the lease; once the lease terminated, the purchaser of the royalty interest foreclosed upon owned no interest in the mineral estate. This week, the Texas Supreme Court declined to hear Ridgefield’s appeal of the El Paso Court’s judgment.

Alberta Griffith owned a 1/7^th interest in the surface and minerals in a section of land in Reeves County. When she died her interest passed to her two sons, Albert and David, subject to a life estate interest in her surviving husband. In 1975, the husband and sons signed an oil and gas lease to Billings, reserving a 1/8th royalty. A well, the Meriwether No. 1, was completed on the lease.

In 1998, there was a small tax debt owed by Mr. Griffith and Albert on their royalty in the Meriwether lease. That year the taxing districts filed suit to foreclose tax liens against several hundred defendants, including Mr. Griffith and Albert. In the suit their interests were each described as a .005952 decimal interest in the Meriwether lease (each owning a royalty of 1/3 of 1/7 of 1/8 royalty). Judgment was entered foreclosing the lien, the interests were sold at Sheriff’s sale, and the interests came to be owned by Magnolia, LLC.

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Published on: August 8, 2022

Ownership of Pore Space – North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Protects Surface Owners’ Rights

By John McFarland

Last week the Supreme Court of North Dakota handed down its opinion in Northwest Landowners Association v. State of North Dakota, 2022 ND 150. The court struck down portions of a statute passed by the North Dakota Legislature, Senate Bill 2344, dealing with ownership rights to “pore space.” North Dakota law defines “pore space” as “a cavity or void, whether natural or artificially created, in a subsurface sedimentary stratum.” The purpose of the statute was to facilitate operators’ use of pore space for saltwater disposal and CO2 injection in tertiary recovery operations, and to deny landowners the right to compensation for such uses. But the language of the statute is much broader:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person conducting unit operations for enhanced oil recovery, utilization of carbon dioxide for enhanced recovery of oil, gas, and other minerals, disposal operations, or any other operation authorized by the commission under this chapter may utilize subsurface geologic formations in the state for such operations or any other permissible purpose under this chapter. Any other provision of law may not be construed to entitle the owner of a subsurface geologic formation to prohibit or demand payment for the use of the subsurface geologic formation for unit operations for enhanced oil recovery, utilization of carbon dioxide for enhanced recovery of oil, gas, and other minerals, disposal operations, or any other operation conducted under this chapter. As used in this section, “subsurface geologic formation” means any cavity or void, whether natural or artificially created, in a subsurface sedimentary stratum.

North Dakota (unlike Texas) has a statute, the Damage Compensation Act, requiring that requiring a mineral developer to compensate the surface owner for “lost land value, lost use of and access to the surface owner’s land, and lost value of improvements caused by drilling operations.” N.D.C.C. sec. 38-11.1-04. Senate Bill 2344 amended the Damage Compensation Act to exclude “pore space” from its definition of “land.”

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