Recent Cases

Published on: May 9, 2023

EP Energy v. Storey Minerals – a $41 million most-favored-nations clause

EP Energy E&P Co., L.P. v. Storey Minerals, Ltd., 2022 SL 223253 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2022, pet. denied)

The Texas Supreme Court recently refused to review the opinion of the San Antonio Court of Appeals in this case, involving construction of a favored nations clause in an oil and gas lease. The court of appeals held that, under the favored nations clause, EP Energy owed the lessor an additional $41 million bonus. One judge dissented.

The case also recounts the “colorful history” of the Altito Ranch, covering about 23,000 acres in La Salle County. EP Energy’s brief describes that history:

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Published on: March 10, 2023

Devon v. Sheppard — A Win for Royalty Owners

By John McFarland

Today the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Devon v. Sheppard, No. 20-0904, again addressing post-production cost deductions from royalties. The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ ruling in favor of the royalty owners.

Sheppard leased minerals in the Eagle Ford Shale in 2007, before the first successful well in the Eagle Ford. Sheppard is a lawyer in Cuero, Texas. His lease required payment of royalties on gross proceeds of sale, without deduction of post-production costs. The lease also contained this provision:

If any disposition, contract or sale of oil or gas shall include any reduction or charge for the expenses or costs of production, treatment, transportation, manufacturing, processing or marketing of the oil or gas, then such deduction, expense or costs shall be added to … gross proceeds so that Lessor’s royalty shall never be chargeable directly or indirectly with any costs or expenses other than its pro rata share of severance or production taxes.

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Published on: March 8, 2023

Railroad Commission v. Apache – The Issue of Standing

By John McFarland

Recently the US Supreme Court heard argument in Biden v. Nebraska, in which several states challenge the President’s authority to forgive student loans. Lost in much of the coverage was the administration’s challenge to the states’ standing to bring the case. “Standing” is a difficult concept to get your arms around. Courts cannot issue advisory opinions. Under Article III of the US Constitution, courts can decide only a “case or controversy.” That means the plaintiff must have a stake in the outcome different from the general public. To have standing, a plaintiff must have sustained or be threatened with an injury different from or in addition to the general public. The Biden administration argued that the states who sued would not suffer any injury because of Biden’s forgiveness of student loans, and therefore do not have standing to sue.

The concept of standing is important to the separation of powers in our federal and state judicial systems. It is a check on the power of courts. Nebraska could not simply ask the court to declare Biden’s loan forgiveness an unconstitutional exercise of executive power without first showing how the state would be injured by Biden’s action. Such an opinion would be an “advisory opinion.”

What does this have to do with Railroad Commission v. Apache?

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Published on: February 17, 2023

Van Dyke v. The Navigator Group – Double Fractions and the Presumed Grant Doctrine

By John McFarland

Today the Texas Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Van Dyke v. The Navigator Group, resolving a ten-year dispute over the ownership of royalty interests and $44 million in royalties.

In 1924, the Mulkeys conveyed their ranch to White and Tom, with the following reservation:

It is understood and agreed that one-half of one-eighth of all minerals and mineral rights in said land are reserved in grantors … and are not conveyed herein.

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Published on: February 13, 2023

“whether or not in paying quantities”

By John McFarland

Last year the 14th Court of Appeals in Houston issue an opinion that should serve as a warning to mineral owners, Thistle Creek Ranch v. Ironroc Energy Partners, No. 14-20-00347-CV.

Thistle Creek sued IronRoc to terminate an oil and gas lease it claimed had expired for lack of production in paying quantities. The lease is on a form I have seen before. The habendum clause provides:

Unless sooner terminated or longer kept in force under other provisions hereof, this lease shall remain in force for a term of three (3) years from the date hereof, hereinafter called “primary term,” and as long thereafter as operations, as hereinafter defined, are conducted upon said land with no cessation for more than ninety (90) consecutive days.

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Published on: January 6, 2023

Davis v. JD Minerals: another fixed vs floating royalty dispute

By John McFarland

Last month the El Paso Court of Appeals issued its opinion in a long-running dispute over royalties on a section of land in Upton County. Davis et al. v. COG Operating, LLC, et al., No. 08-20-00205-CV. The court addressed several issues, one of which was the construction of a 1939 deed that reserved a royalty interest described as “one-fourth of the 1/8 royalty usually reserved by and to be paid to the land owner in event of execution of oil and gas leases, so that 1/4 of the 1/8 royalty to be paid to us, our heirs or assigns, if, as and when produced from the above described land ….” The court concluded that this was a “floating” royalty equal to 1/4th of the royalty reserved in the lease, not a fixed 1/4 of 1/8 royalty. This appears to be the correct result based on other recent cases construing similar language.

I have a bone to pick, however, with the language in the opinion describing the royalty reserved. To be fair, other courts have made the same error, and the same error was made by the appellants in their brief. The court concluded that the grantors reserved “a floating, 1/4 NPRI in Section 45.” A 1/4 NPRI is a 1/4th royalty interest, not 1/4th of the royalty reserved in the lease. A 1/4th royalty is equivalent to one out of every four barrels produced. One-fourth of the royalty under a lease reserving a 1/4th royalty is 1/4 of 1/4, or 1/16 royalty interest, not a 1/4th NPRI. Clearly, in using the term “floating, 1/4 NPRI” the court meant to conclude that the deed reserved 1/4th of the royalty reserved in any future lease. But referring to it as a 1/4 NPRI is confusing.

Published on: December 20, 2022

Year in Review: Significant Cases and Events

By John McFarland

Winter Storm Uri

The fallout from the Texas Freeze in February 2021 continues. A year later, UT’s Austin Energy Institute concluded that multiple failures of power plants, gas processing plants, gas storage and distribution facilities, and gas production all contributed to the system failures. ERCOT management was fired; natural gas prices spiked to more than $400/MMBtu; politicians blamed wind and solar generation; the legislature passed legislation requiring the Public Utility Commission and the Railroad Commission to strengthen weatherization requirements for production, processing and generation facilities and has since criticized those agencies for failing to fix the problem. ERCOT drastically raised electricity prices during the storm, resulting in multiple bankruptcies. The legislature provided for securitization of about $7 billion in private losses caused by the storm, so those losses are spread over the next twenty years in customer rate increases. Expect new legislation in the upcoming session.

Mitchell v. Map Resources, 649 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. 2022)

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Published on: December 5, 2022

Hahn v. ConocoPhillips — another case on fractional vs. fraction of royalty

By John McFarland

Last week the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals issued a decision on a long-running dispute over reservation of a royalty interest in a deed. This is the court’s second opinion in the case.

In the court’s first opinion in 2018, the court construed the following royalty reservation:

SAVE AND EXCEPT and there is hereby reserved to [Hahn] herein, his heirs and assigns, an undivided one-half (1/2) non-participating interest in and to all of the royalty [Hahn] now owns, (same being an undivided one-half (1/2) of [Hahn’s] one-fourth (1/4) or an undivided one-eighth (1/8) royalty) in and to all of the oil royalty, gas royalty and royalty in other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the herein described property.

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Published on: November 8, 2022

EnerVest v. Mayfield – another loss for royalty owners on post-production costs

By John McFarland

Mayfield and Ingham leased several sections in Sutton County to EnerVest. EnerVest produces gas which goes to a gas plant for processing and pays royalty on the residue gas and natural gas liquids, after deducting post-production costs. The gas must be compressed and dehydrated before sale, and EnerVest does not pay royalty on the fuel used in compression and dehydration. Mayfield and Ingham sued EnerVest seeking royalties on the fuel gas.

The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that, under the lease royalty provisions, EnerVest does not owe royalties on fuel gas. EnerVest v. Mayfield, No. 04-21-00337-CV.

The lease provides for payment “on gas produced from said land and sold or used off the premises, … the market value at the mouth of the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used.” Another lease clause provides:

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Published on: October 3, 2022

Who owns rights to store oil in an underground salt cavern?

By John McFarland

Last June the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals decided that the right to store oil in a salt cavern belongs to the surface owner. In Myers-Woodward, LLC v. Underground Services Markham, LLC, et al., No. 13-20-00172-CV, the court addressed a dispute between Myers-Woodward, which owned the surface estate and a royalty on minerals, including salt, in a tract in which Underground Services owned the salt. Underground Services mined and sold salt by solution-mining from a salt cavern under the land. Myers-Woodward disputed how Underground calculated its royalties on the salt. Underground also asserted that, as owner of the salt, it has the right to use the resulting salt cavern to store hydrocarbons. The court ruled in favor of Underground on its method of determining the royalties owed, but it ruled in favor of Myers-Underwood on the right to use the resulting salt cavern, holding that Myers-Underwood held the storage rights, a part of its rights as owner of the surface estate.

Underground cited Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 808 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.App.–Beaumont 1991), rev’d on other grounds 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex 1991), in support of its claim to storage rights. Mapco has often been cited as lending uncertainty to the issue of whether the surface owner owns the pore space under its land. The Beaumont court in Mapco, without citing any authority, held that the mineral owner had storage rights for underground storage facilities. After reviewing other authority, the Corpus Christi court concluded that, contrary to Mapco, “the well-recognized, decisional law states that the mineral estate owner owns the minerals but not the subsurface. … Therefore, we decline to follow Mapco in this case.”

Storage rights have become a more important issue recently with the advent of CO2 sequestration projects in Texas. Although the court did not cite Lightning Oil v. Anadarko, Lightning would seem to support its conclusion as well.